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Highly skilled migration from Poland and other CEE countries – myths and reality 
Paweł Kaczmarczyk1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Poland is usually perceived and described as a typical emigration country. International migration 
does in fact play a significant role in the contemporary history of Poland and in the process of its 
socio-economic development. However, until the late 1990s migration-related issues were almost 
absent in public debate with a few exceptions, such as post-1968 migration resulting from the anti-
Zionist campaign, migration of “ethnic Germans” in the 1950s and 1970s, or politically-driven 
migration in the 1980s. The debate on the causes and consequences of migration started yet again 
prior to Poland’s accession to the European Union as part of a general discussion on the potential 
consequences of the accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the EU, and 
then continued due to the spectacular increase in the scale of the mobility of Poles in the post-
accession period. Paradoxically, in contrast to migration debates prior to EU enlargement, when 
numerous hazards were voiced as to what would be the impact of the expected inflow of people on 
EU residents.  In current debate, the issue of the consequences of outflow for Polish economy and 
society plays the most prominent role. Commonly expressed threats include labour shortages on 
the Polish market and the so-called brain drain understood as outflow of highly skilled persons.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the mobility of the highly skilled in the broader context of recent 
trends in international migration. Particularly, questions pertaining to the extent to which migration 
of people of high human capital is a statistically significant phenomenon and the possible 
consequences of recent outflow will be raised. The main emphasis will be put on Poland as the 
most important sending country in the region. However, the analysis will be complemented by data 
from other CEE countries. 
 
2. Migration trends in the EU8 countries – a general overview 
The major problem with assessment of migration trends in most CEE countries is related to 
methodological and statistical issues. In the communist period, a uniform and particular migration 
registration system was introduced. The system was based on a specific definition of a migrant, 
closely connected to documented permanent residence in the country. As a consequence, in the 
majority of CEE countries an emigrant is (still) defined as a person who has declared an intention 
to leave for another country (left with an intention to settle abroad) by de-registering him- or herself 
from their permanent place of residence. In no way does such a concept of a migrant relate to the 
duration (neither actual nor declared) of stay in the destination country. According to Okólski 
(1997), this makes migration statistics in the EU8 countries incompatible with the respective 
statistics in the overwhelming majority of other countries, which causes serious problems when 
assessing the scale of and trends in migration. 
The restrictive entry and exit rules, efficient border control, and strict passport policy provided for 
reasonably accurate statistics in the pre-transition period. However, one of the side effects of the 
introduction of democratic rules and liberalization of migration policy was that such system ceased 
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to be a source of reliable statistics, especially with regard to emigration. During the next decade or 
so, the EU8 countries attempted to develop alternative sources of data related to international 
migration. Those sources, however, are hardly uniform, and they generate statistics of various 
coverage and quality. As an extreme case is demonstrated by Hungary where practically no 
information on emigration is available. Important data sources in EU8 that could be used in the 
present analysis of flows from the EU8 countries include: central population registers (still bound to 
the concept of permanent residence), population censuses (carried out, depending on country, in 
2000-2002) and labour force surveys (LFS). One possible solution is to resort to the data on 
inflows and stocks collected by destination countries, but in this case the major problem results 
from international differences in the ways immigrants are defined and recorded. Moreover, the data 
from sending and receiving countries are hardly comparable (see Bijak et al. 2004).  
In general, the socio-economic transition also entailed significant changes with respect to 
international mobility in the EU8 countries. In the pre-transition period, the region experienced a 
large variety of outflows and a few inflows. Despite strict administrative restrictions, outflow was the 
predominant type of migration and in a few cases, particularly in that of Poland, occurred on a very 
large scale. In a few countries, mainly in the Baltic states, an ethnically-driven migration took place 
on a mass scale. The situation changed radically after 1989 – since then the outflow has become 
much lower and less diversified than before, while inflows have begun to rise and become greatly 
differentiated. The only countries continually sending considerable quantities of people to other 
countries remained Poland and the Baltic states, particularly Lithuania.  
This observation is borne out by official statistical data, although it reflects the real scale of 
migration only to a very small extent. For instance, in the first half of the 1990s, official emigration 
from Lithuania was recorded at the level of 3,000 people annually, in Poland between 20,000 and 
25,000 annually. For other countries of the region, the officially registered migrations were even 
smaller: the Czech data indicate the outflow of 1,000 citizens annually in the years 2001-2004, 
while almost 2,000 returnees were recorded on the annual basis, in the years 1998-2005 the 
annual number of emigrants from Slovakia did not exceed 2,000 persons. In the period 1997-2001 
less than 1,500 Slovene citizens emigrated each year (Lubyova 2005; OECD 2005; Zavratnic 
Zimic 2003). 
The real outflow was much higher. Migration from Lithuania estimated on the basis of the 
population censuses consisted of as many as 22,000 persons annually. According to the 2002 
population census in Poland, the official emigration figures for 1989-2000 should have been more 
than tripled to give realistic estimates. The picture changes also upon deeper analysis of the 
statistics on temporary mobility. At least two types of migration are worth noting: seasonal 
migration (regulated predominantly by bilateral agreements between East and West European 
governments) and cross-border mobility. As far as seasonal migration is concerned, the main 
destination countries are Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom, but Germany receives 
by far the largest numbers of seasonal workers. In 2004 over 330,000 persons from Eastern 
Europe were temporarily employed there, over 90 per cent of whom were from the EU8 countries. 
Since the very beginning of the programme the structure of migrants according to their citizenship 
has remained more or less constant: Poles constitute the vast majority of seasonal workers (86 per 
cent to 91 per cent)2. The seasonal flow of over a quarter million persons a year from Poland alone 
is currently the largest individual flow in the region (or was prior to mass migration to the UK and 
Ireland). With regard to cross-border movements, the most significant flows take place on the 
‘old’ borders of West and East European countries. For instance, in the beginning of the 1990s the 
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number of Czechs commuting to Germany and employed mainly as irregular workers was as high 
as 50,000 persons3. Another meaningful instance are cross-border movements of people from 
Slovenia to Austria and Italy. In 2000, the number of Slovenians crossing borders to work on daily 
commuter basis has been estimated at almost 13,000 (Zavratnic Zimic 2003). Additionally, a hardly 
estimateable number of persons engage in semi-legal or illegal migration. 
All in all, the key observation in the context of this paper is that in terms of the size of migration 
flows, Poland is by all means the most important country in the region. Thus, the analysis provided 
will concentrate on the migration of Poles, with some reference to other CEE countries, particularly 
the Baltic states and Hungary. 
 
3. Polish migration prior to and after May 2004 – what do we and do not know? 
Since the 19th century, Poland has been playing an ever more significant role in the global 
migration system as one of the chief sending countries. However, apart from mass movements of 
population caused by the redrawing of state borders and related international agreements, 
migration from Poland after the Second World War was seriously limited. Similarly to other 
countries in the region, a very low scale of mobility was a consequence of the restrictive migration 
policy imposed by the communist regime. The increase in migration was associated first with the 
political “thaw” in the mid-1950s, and then with the liberalisation in cross-border movements and 
the normalisation of Polish-German relations in the 1970s. Migration to the West constituted the 
most numerous flow prior to 1989. A range of push factors of political and economic nature were 
decisive in the formation of migratory phenomena at that time. Simultaneously, the Western 
European (and North American) labour market absorbed migrants easily, and additionally the 
declaration of an “open door” policy for political migrants from Central and Eastern Europe allowed 
for their easier functioning within host countries. According to official statistics, annual emigration 
figures in the 1970s ranged between 20,000 and 35,000 but the number of short-term flows mainly 
formed by ‘false’ tourists was much higher. The total number of long-term emigrants from Poland in 
the 1980s is estimated between 1.1 and 1.3 million people (3 per cent of the total population). Over 
a million people who spent more than three and less than twelve months abroad should also be 
taken into account (Okólski 2006; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2002). 
The comparison of pre-transition and transition trends is hardly plausible. Contrary to the situation 
in the 1980s, there are no unambiguous nor exhaustive data on migration from Poland in the 
1990s and early 2000s4. The few existing sources of data capture only a part of the phenomenon, 
they are to some extent complementary but should be interpreted with caution. In the following 
part, the description of current trends in migration from Poland will be based on the following data 
sources: 1) data compiled by the Central Statistical Office on the basis of the Central Population 
Register; 2) data from the 2002 National Census; 3) Labour Force Survey data; 4) data compiled 
by the Polish Ministry of Labour on seasonal migration to Germany, and 5) data on Polish migrants 
registered in the Workers Registration Scheme in the United Kingdom and in the Personal Public 
Service system in Ireland.  
 
                                                 
3 Then, due to restrictions introduced by German labour administration dropped to 30,000-35,000 in 1995 (Drbohlav 2004). 
4 A very good source of information of Poles international mobility in previous decades was police register of cross border movements. 
However, this register was eliminated in late 1980s. 
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Official statistics data gathered by the Central Statistical Office are based on the Central 
Population Register (so-called PESEL) which records permanent residents of Poland. As stated 
earlier, according to the adopted definition, the population of emigrants includes only those 
permanent residents of Poland who left Poland in order to settle abroad, having registered their 
departure with an administrative unit. Therefore, the official data on migration portrays only a small 
fraction of the phenomenon, i.e. departures recorded as a permanent change of residence. The 
data shows a clear stabilization in the number of departures associated with the declared change 
in place of residence at 20,000 - 25,000 annually. In total, in the light of official statistics over 
216,000 people left Poland between 1990 and 1999 with the intention to settle abroad. Most recent 
data for 2004 reveal that 18,877 people emigrated from Poland, while almost 9,500 immigrated to 
the country. Emigration from Poland thus reached the lowest level since the mid-1980s, but at the 
same time the volume of migrants increased in the first half of 2005 by 20 per cent as compared to 
the same period in the previous year. In 2004 three traditionally most important destination 
countries (Germany, the United States and Canada) were continuously loosing their importance (a 
decrease by 16 per cent in the case of Germany), while the increase in numbers of persons 
migrating to such countries as the United Kingdom (93 per cent increase as compared to previous 
year), Spain (45 per cent) or Sweden (49 per cent) was recorded (Kepinska 2006).  
More reliable data concerning migrants staying abroad in the 1990s and early 2000s may be 
obtained from registries and surveys. The 1995 Microcensus showed that about 900,000 
permanent residents of Poland had temporarily (i.e. for over two months) stayed abroad, which 
amounts to about 2 per cent of the total population. According to the 2002 National Census, as 
many as 786,100 Polish citizens, counted as members of households in Poland, were staying 
abroad for longer than 2 months (1.8 per cent of the population) at the time of the survey. From the 
data on the year of departure it follows that the number of migrants who went abroad in 1989-1990 
was approximately 50,000 per year, then it dropped to 20,000-25,000 in the years 1993-1996, and 
started to rise again in 1997. Based on this data source the annual number of emigrants reached 
61,000 in 2000 and 80,000 in 2001 (Kepinska 2006). 
 
The best source to monitor intertemporal changes in Poles’ mobility is the quarterly Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) which since 1994 has recorded Polish citizens staying abroad. These data pertain 
only to adult persons who at the time of the survey have been abroad for longer than 2 months 
and, at the same time, who had at least one household member still living in Poland5.  The Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) indicates that 130,000-290,000 adults were staying abroad in each year 
between 1994 and 2005 (2nd quarter) – cf. Figure 1.  
                                                 
5 It is necessary to note that Labour Force Data has serious limitations with regard to migration analysis. First of all, it was gathered 
primarily for the purpose of the labour market analysis. As a consequence, the sample is not adapted to the needs of international 
mobility analyses. The Central Statistical Office cannot assure the representativeness of the data and therefore they are not presented 
as official statistics. However, I decided to use this data since it is the only data set showing the dynamics of Poles’ international mobility 
prior to and after EU accession (as a proxy of the trend rather than of the size of migration). 
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Figure 1. Polish migrants by length of their stay abroad, 1994-2005 (in thous.) 
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Source: Author’s elabouration based on the Labour Force Survey data 
 
 
 
According to LFS data, there is a steady increase in the number of Polish migrants observed since 
1998. This trend continued after Poland’s accession into the EU: in 2004 on average 250,000 
Poles stayed abroad for at least two months and this figure constituted an over 20 per cent 
increase in comparison to 2003. Additionally, in each of the first two quarters of 2005, the number 
of migrants was higher than in the corresponding quarters of 2004. 
Two important features of contemporary migration from Poland are obvious while analyzing the 
LFS data. The first one is the predominance of labour migration. LFS has proven that between 70 
and 80 percent of migrants undertake work during their stay abroad and the share of migrant 
workers in the 1990s and 2000s is relatively stable. Secondly, the predominance of short-term 
migration is becoming more and more evident: a significant part of all temporary migrants (60-70 
per cent) stayed abroad for shorter than 12 months (cf. Figure 1). The number of such persons 
increased considerably, particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s. To compare: short-term 
migrants (staying abroad for longer than 2 months but shorter than 12 months) amounted to 60 per 
cent in 2004, 53 per cent in 2003, and 48 per cent in 1995. This phenomenon is clearly identified 
by Figure 2 presenting migration trends with the exclusion of seasonal fluctuations.  
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Figure 2. Polish migrants by length of their stay abroad, 2000-2005, 2nd quarters (in thous.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elabouration based on the Labour Force Survey data 
 
 
 
From the presented data if follows that in the early 2000s the increase in migration was almost 
exclusively a result of raising short-term mobility: the number of migrants who were staying abroad 
for shorter than 12 months more than doubled between 2000 and 2005. At the same time the 
number of persons staying abroad for longer than 12 months remained relatively stable. If we take 
into consideration the fact that the Labour Force Survey data does not include seasonal workers 
who usually stay abroad for less than 2 months, we can conclude that temporary mobility has 
become an important feature of contemporary Polish migration.  
As follows from the LFS data (cf. Figure 3), the distribution of major destination countries did not 
change dramatically after May 2004. Germany remained the major receiving country of Polish 
migrants6. In the case of all second quarters of the years 2000-2005 migrants to Germany 
dominated among all migrants from Poland. However, their share is gradually decreasing: from 35 
per cent in 2000 to 25 per cent in 2005 (among all migrants and migrant workers). Since Poland’s 
accession to the EU, migrants to Germany have still accounted for approximately one-forth of the 
total, but the most striking feature is the large increase in the number of migrants to the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, i.e. the countries which decided to open their labour markets for migrants 
from Poland and other accession countries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Even if the data on Polish seasonal workers is not considered. 
Center for International Relations© 
 7
Figure 3. Polish labour migrants by country of destination, 2000-2005, 2nd quarters (in per 
cent of all migrant workers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elabouration based on the Labour Force Survey data 
 
In the second quarter of 2005, the UK and Ireland registered the largest increase in migration in 
comparison to the second quarter of 2004: 221 per cent and 150 per cent, respectively. 
Consequently, in the second quarter of 2005 the share of migrants to the UK in the total number of 
temporary migrants from Poland reached 20 per cent (in 2000 – 4 per cent), and in the case of 
Ireland – 6 per cent (0 per cent in 2000). Figure 3 clearly shows that since the early 2000s, the 
destinations of Polish migrants have gradually diversified, with a more and more important role 
played by such countries as Italy, Spain or Belgium (except from the above mentioned, i.e. 
Germany, the UK and Ireland).    
Due to the fact that LFS data encompass only those migrants who are staying abroad for longer 
than 2 months, it is necessary to add about 300,000-350,000 Poles who each year find legal 
employment abroad on the basis of bilateral international agreements to the above presented 
numbers. An overwhelming majority of these are seasonal workers and, significantly, more than 
half are employed in Germany. According to the 1990 Bilateral Agreement on labour migration 
between the Polish and German government, Polish workers are allowed to take up legal work in 
selected sectors7 of the German economy. Soon after the Agreement came into force, a dynamic 
inflow of seasonal labour migrants from Poland occurred. Already in 1991 approximately 78,600 
seasonal Polish workers entered Germany, while in 1992 - 137,000 arrived. Since 1994 a steady 
increase has been observed – in consequence, in 2002 the immigration of Polish seasonal workers 
reached over 300,000, and in 2005 over 320,000 workers were registered.  
Following May 1st 2004, the above presented data sets can be supplemented by immigration-
related data from those countries which decided to open their labour markets for workers from the 
CEE countries. The accession into the EU has to a great extent intensified visits of EU8 citizens to 
                                                 
7 Polish workers were allowed to take up jobs in such sectors as agriculture, construction and exhibitions. In 1993 due to the German 
labour market conditions construction has been excluded from the sectors available for the Polish seasonal workers. 
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the UK. The International Passenger Survey (IPS) records all visits to the UK and may serve as a 
proxy of labour mobility, though obviously it includes all entries into the UK, and not only those of 
persons arriving with an intention to undertake work.  
Table 1. Number of visits to the UK by the nationals of the selected EU 15 and the 
Accession countries, 2003-2005 (in thousands) 
Source: Fihel, Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2006. 
From the data presented in table 1 it follows that the dynamics of visits to the UK by the nationals 
of selected EU8 countries was 3-5 times higher than EU15 average – the data shows also the 
spectacular dynamics of most recent mobility of the CEE countries’ residents. The highest increase 
was recorded in case of citizens of Slovakia, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania. Over 1.1 million Poles 
visited the UK in 2005 only (as compared to less than 300 thousand in 2003). The dynamics of 
visits to the UK is also shown below: 
Figure 4. Number of visits to the UK by the nationals of the Accession countries, 2003-2006 
(in thousands) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fihel, Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2006. 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2005/2003 (in  per cent) 
France 2 845 3 149 3 224 113,32% 
Germany 2 490 2 573 2 674 107,39% 
Ireland 2 206 2 147 2 388 108,25% 
Spain 855 1 047 1 163 136,02% 
EU 15 13 346 14 522 14 996 112,36% 
     
Czech Republic 185 212 249 134,59% 
Estonia 17 30 44 258,82% 
Hungary 87 169 213 244,83% 
Latvia 14 53 72 514,29% 
Lithuania 34 70 133 391,18% 
Poland 278 646 1 127 405,40% 
Slovakia 34 106 189 555,88% 
Slovenia 27 47 45 166,67% 
EU8 countries 677 1 334 2 071 305,91% 
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Obviously, the above presented data should not be used to analyze labour migration from the new 
accession countries, but shows the spectacular dynamics of post-accession mobility. With regard 
to labour migration, in case of the UK and Ireland the data on labour migration are provided by 
specific registers applied after opening their labour markets. WRS is the register of all migrants 
from the EU8 countries wishing to take up employment in the United Kingdom. It was set up on 
May 1st, 2004 in order to provide at least basic information on post-accession migration flows. The 
data are far from being perfect as only applications/applicants are recorded and not migrants in 
general, and there is no possibility of checking whether the applicant is still staying in the United 
Kingdom8. Nevertheless, WRS allows for tracing migration trends and at least estimating the scale 
of migration from EU8 countries.  
The WRS data – published regularly by the Home Office - shows that the total number of workers 
from the A8 countries registered in the UK between May 2004 and June 2006 amounted to 
427,000 (447,000 applicants and 558,000 approved applications, incl. 101,000 of applications to 
re-register lodged by those workers who had changed employers)9. Migrants from Poland 
constituted 62 per cent of the above presented numbers, making it thus the most important 
sending country – as of June 2006 the number of applicants from Poland was 264,500. This data 
should not be used as a direct measure of the inflow of workers into the UK. In fact, in May 2004, 
when the British labour market was opened to new EU countries, thousands of Czechs, Slovaks 
and Poles had already been working in the British Islands. According to the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) carried out in the United Kingdom, in 2003, i.e. before the accession to the European Union, 
as many as 21,000 immigrants from the Czech Republic and Slovakia and 34,000 from Poland 
lived in the country, and the trend was clearly rising, especially in the case of Poland (Salt 2005). 
For most of them applying to the WRS was the only way to legitimize their employment in the 
United Kingdom. In May 2004, almost 6,000 applications were made but only one in four by the 
newly arrived EU8 citizens (Portes and French 2005). In two months’ time, however, newly arrived 
migrants dominated the group of applicants.  
If we assume that the number and structure of applications to the WRS may serve as a proxy of 
“real” migration to the country – which does seem reasonable to some extent – the data provided 
by the Home Office allows building quite a precise picture of contemporary migration to the UK. 
The data reveals that migrants to the UK are predominantly young persons, more than 80 per cent 
being aged 18 to 34, and males. Only 7 per cent of the registered workers moved with their 
dependants which, in fact, may suggest that this is short-term migration only. Migrant workers from 
the “new” member countries tend to concentrate in some sectors, namely in administration, 
business and management (34 per cent), hospitality and catering (21 per cent), agriculture (12 per 
cent), manufacturing (7 per cent) and agriculture-related sectors (5 per cent)10. A sharp increase 
was recorder particularly in the case of administration, business and management sector: the 
proportion of workers who had applied for work in this sector increased from 17 per cent (last 
quarter of 2004) to 44 per cent (last quarter of 2005) (see the analysis in part 5).  
Ireland, another EU15 country that opened its labour market to the citizens of new accession 
countries on May 1st, 2004, has been relatively open to the inflow from those counties already 
                                                 
8 In addition, an application costs 50 pounds, which might be a disincentive to register. 
9 The German Economic Institute (DIW) made an evaluation of the above presented data and reached the conclusion that in fact in the 
period May 2004 – April 2005 only 50,000 instead 175,000 migrations were recorded. The difference is due to the fact that each 
registration represents one workplace and not necessarily one migrant and that according to the estimates of Home Office more than 40 
per cent of registered migrants were present in the UK prior to the accession and simply used the opportunity to legalize their stay 
abroad (Traser 2005). However, based on the Labour Force survey data Portes and French (2005) showed that the WRS depicts the 
migration phenomenon quite precisely although they suggest that many of the newcomers left the country after a few months. 
10 Due to the very nature of work, employment in agriculture is strictly seasonal – in the summertime the share of employment in this 
sector was higher than 20 per cent.  
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since 2001. The scale of immigration to Ireland is reflected by the data on Personal Public Service 
numbers (PPS) to be acquired by every migrant worker (Figure 5). The total of PPS numbers 
issued to the EU8 nationals increased from 10,000 in 2001 to 75,000 in 2005 (in the period 2001-
2005, 162,000 PPS numbers were issued to EU8 citizens). In 2001 the shares of PPS numbers 
issued to Poles, Lithuanians and Latvians were almost equal to 27 per cent in case of each group. 
In the following years, the relative share of Polish migrants has been rapidly increasing reaching up 
to 47 per cent in 2004 and 57 per cent in 2005.  
 
Figure 5. PPS numbers issued to labour migrants in Ireland, by year and country of 
citizenship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Skills needs in the Irish economy… 2006 
Similarly to the evidence from Britain, also in Ireland Poles proved to be by far the most highly 
prone to migrate for work of all EU8 nationals (43,000 workers registered in 2005). The number of 
Lithuanian workers in 2005 (15,000) was only one-third of that of Poles (43,000), and of Latvians 
(7,500) only one-sixth. The number of Slovaks, Czechs, Hungarians and Estonians varied between 
1,000 and 5,000 whereas the number of Slovenians was below 100. Unlike in the case of Britain, in 
Ireland migrant workers from EU8 are employed in considerable proportions both in low-skilled 
sectors (construction industry, tourism, agriculture and food processing) and high-skilled sectors 
(finance, information and communication technology, healthcare). 
The prevalence of Polish nationals in the group of migrants from the EU8 countries is also marked 
in Scandinavian countries, especially in Norway. In the period from May 2004 to August 2005 the 
number of first-time work permits issued to Polish citizens was as high as 8,900 in Norway, 3,800 
in Sweden and 1,700 in Denmark. Out of all 29,000 migrants from the EU8 countries who were 
granted permission to work in this period in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, 61 per cent came 
from Poland.  
From the above presented data it follows that it would be hardly possible to draw a comprehensive 
and reliable picture of contemporary migration from Poland or other CEE countries. The quoted 
data sources are marked by serious shortcomings. There is no reliable data on illegal migration to 
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such countries as Germany, the UK or Ireland11. One has to remember that irregularity was one of 
the most important features of Polish migration in the 1990s. The British example shows clearly 
how complicated it is to forecast migration in a dynamically changing environment. Prior to the 
decision on opening its labour market, the British government attempted to estimate the potential 
post-enlargement labour flows. The outcome was rather low – the number of annual inflow from all 
accession countries was estimated at 5,000 – 13,000, which constitutes less than 10 per cent of 
recorded registrations with the WRS. This difference is partly due to methodological problems with 
the data base – e.g. we do not know how many applicants had been staying in the UK prior to the 
accession and how many decided to leave after completion of the registry – yet the major 
argument relates to the very fact that only three countries decided to open their labour markets for 
citizens of “new” member countries and quantitative scenarios were prepared based on different 
assumptions. 
However, a number of important features of contemporary migration from Poland can be 
pinpointed upon analysis of the existing data on migration. The first two have already been stated: 
the prevalence of labour migration, and an increasingly evident predominance of short-term 
migration. Thirdly, despite institutional changes and selective opening of labour markets in the “old” 
EU member states, the composition of destination countries has not changed significantly. That is 
particularly true if we take into consideration seasonal migration to Germany, to mention this fact 
once again. However, the portfolio of destination countries is changing slowly with Germany losing 
its top position and the UK and Ireland gaining position in the light of the latest migration from 
Poland. In general, and this holds true for Poland as well as other CEE countries, migration from 
the EU8 countries to Western Europe did not begin on May 1st, 2004. A large scale of the flow  
which was recorded afterwards, particularly in case of the UK and Ireland, seems to result, at least 
partially, from the registration (legalization) of undocumented migrants who arrived in these 
countries prior to May 1st, 2004. From the existing statistical data it follows that – contrary to public 
perception – the opening of a number of labour markets in the ‘old’ European Union did not bring 
about mass migration from new member states. The migration potential has been triggered off only 
in Poland, followed by Lithuania, and to a lesser extent by Slovakia and Latvia, with the remaining 
EU8 countries being almost unaffected.  
 
4. The mobility of highly skilled persons 
Due to the limited availability and problematic quality of migration data, the analysis of international 
mobility of people is a complex and difficult task. This is particularly true in analysis of the situation 
of particular groups, as in case of highly skilled persons. Additional complications appear when 
attempting to assess the most recent migration trends, i.e. mobility since the accession of 8 CEE 
countries to the EU. The available data are fragmentary only thus enabling to draw conclusions 
about general tendencies rather than a detailed picture of the phenomenon. 
Traditionally, considerable role in Poles’ mobility was ascribed to the emigration of highly skilled 
persons. Similarly to other less developed countries, this process was described and interpreted in 
the categories of brain drain. However, upon analysis of data on international migration, this thesis 
seems to be rather questionable with reference to almost the whole post-war period. With an 
exception of an episode of (partially) forced migration of persons of Jewish descent (1968-1971), 
when over 13,000 of mostly highly educated persons left Poland, the share of persons with tertiary 
                                                 
11 In the late 1990s various studies estimated the scale of irregular employment of Polish migrants in Western host countries at a 
minimum of 150,000-200,000 annually.  
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education among all migrants did not differ significantly from that of the total population12. 
However, the situation changed in the late 1970s and 1980s. The brain drain thesis is particularly 
true in the case of massive outflow in the 1980s. Calculations based on the policy register’s data 
show that of almost 700,000 emigrants who left Poland between April 1st, 1981 and December 6th, 
1988, 15 per cent had a higher degree and 31 per cent had secondary education. If we consider 
that for the whole population the share of university graduates was ca. 7 per cent, the quoted data 
show that there was a considerable overrepresentation of emigrants of high quality human capital 
in relation to the whole population of Poland (Sakson 2002). The scale of the emigration of high-
class specialists in the 1980s was so large that the number of emigrants in this category each year 
(15,000) constituted approximately one fourth of Polish university graduates of all higher education 
institutions (Okólski 1997).  
As follows from various data sources, the situation has much changed during transformation. Using 
the official data, we can assume that since 1990, the share of individuals with the lowest level of 
education has been increasing, while the share of individuals with the highest level of educational 
attainment has been decreasing. At the threshold of transformation in 1988, persons who had 
elementary or lower than elementary education constituted 37 per cent of emigrants aged 15+ 
(with a known level of education), and people with a higher degree – 9 per cent, whereas in 2003, 
there were 55 per cent in the former group, and 4 per cent in the latter. These observations were 
proved by the majority of studies conducted both in Poland and in the receiving countries. CMR 
research in the years 1994-1999 indicated that the claim about the brain drain can be upheld only 
in relation to big urban centres. More importantly in quantitative terms, migration from the 
peripheral regions was dominated by individuals with no more than secondary educational 
attainment, of poor human capital, taking up employment almost exclusively in the secondary 
sectors of labour markets in the host countries (cf. Figure 6)13.  
Similar results were provided by studies conducted both in Poland and in the receiving countries. 
Each of these studies supported the observation that a greater propensity to migrate was typical 
for people with low cultural competencies and no knowledge of foreign languages who 
encountered problems with finding their feet in the new post-communist reality, particularly on the 
labour market. These people were almost fully dependent on the employment offer addressed to 
unskilled workers, willing to start work any time and for any period of time (usually on an extremely 
short-term basis). Exceptions to the case – such as Ireland or the Scandinavian countries – only 
confirmed the general rule (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005).  
The thesis of structural change in Polish migration since 1990 was supported by a few studies on 
highly skilled migration from Poland, particularly in the case of scientists. The factors pushing the 
scientists to go abroad were actually parallel in all CEE countries: low income and worse labour 
conditions, low prestige and social status of science and education, poorly equipped study rooms 
and laboratories, restricted access to the literature, lack of research funds, limited opportunities for 
contacting broader scientific circles. A massive migration abroad could have been expected as the 
education in many states of the region was of top quality.   
Such a prognosis only came true to a certain extent, as can be clearly seen from the results of an 
in-depth survey that covered 1,003 scientific institutions hiring roughly 45 per cent of all the 
scientific workers in Poland and covered the period from 1980 to 1996 (Hryniewicz, Jałowiecki, 
Mync 1992; 1994; 1997). In 1981-1991 all the scientific centres under survey (with the total staff of 
28 500 academic and research workers) lost over one fourth of the staff (as compared to the final 
                                                 
12 In case of emigrating Poles of Jewish descent this share was over 8 times higher than in the total population. 
13 Namysłów, Mońki, Nowy Targ and Warszawa are examples of town communities; Łubniany, Perlejewo – of village communities.  
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date of that period) due to termination of contracts. Emigration constituted “only” 9.5 per cent of the 
staff in 1991, while the scientists’ total outflow reaching 15.1 per cent resulted from so-called 
internal brain drain, i.e. taking up other posts across Poland (such that typically brought about 
higher profits or better career opportunities). This proves that this migration stream originated 
mostly from lack of opportunities for effective application of human resources in Poland, and 
should be described rather in terms of brain overflow than brain drain. 
Figure 6. Migrants with vocational and tertiary education in selected Polish communities14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elabouration based on the CMR survey data 
                                                 
14 See also Jaźwińska and Okólski 2001. 
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Taking into account the outflow of scientists from the institutions under survey in the long-term, i.e. 
1981-1996 (Figure 7) the one remarkable phenomenon is an enormous increase in the number of 
persons who left up to in the years1992-1993, with a radical reverse trend in 1994-1996. The 
reason behind this phenomenon is easy to pinpoint: such interdependence was determined by 
resignations that were not connected with emigration. Up to the early years of the transition period 
an increasing number of people was giving up scientific activities in order to take up positions in 
other industries; in the years 1981-1988 annual resignations of scientists amounted to 1 per cent, 
in 1989-1991 – 2 per cent, in 1992-1993 – as much as 4 per cent. Later, in 1994-1996 this 
tendency diminished; at that time the annual percentage of academic or research staff deciding to 
resign equalled 2 per cent.  
Figure 7. Average annual number of scientists leaving the R&D sector in Poland, 1981-1996 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005, based on Hryniewicz, Jałowiecki, Mync 1997. 
 
In comparison with this phenomenon of a certainly structural profile, emigration of scientists 
seemed rather insignificant; in the longer run it proved to be almost marginal. This is demonstrated 
by its share in the total outflow of scientific workers in subsequent periods, which diminished from 
52 per cent (1981-1984) to 11 per cent (1994-1996). Following 1993, the number of emigrating 
scientists constituted barely 0.2 per cent of the total staff while, e.g. in 1981-1984 it was as high as 
11 per cent. Only some emigrants continued working in the scientific field after they had settled 
abroad (51 per cent of the total), thus human capital should not be considered as transferred but 
rather as partially lost (this also applies to the case of those scientists who left for other positions 
within Poland). 
However, in the second half of the 1990s the trend reversed once again. The structure of migrants 
had changed as a consequence of the educational breakthrough on the one hand and economic 
crisis on the other, particularly the deteriorating situation on the Polish labour market. Such a 
picture emerges from the population census data. According to the Polish census of 2002, among 
the 576,000 permanent residents aged 15 years or more who had been living abroad for at least 
12 months at the time of the census15, 0.7 per cent held a doctoral degree, 10.1 per cent a 
                                                 
15 That was 1.8 per cent of the total number of permanent residents of Poland aged 15 or more years. 
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university diploma (i.e. MA) and 3.2 per cent other tertiary education diplomas (BA), whereas 
among the general population the figures were 0.3 per cent, 7.4 per cent, and 2.7 per cent, 
respectively. Altogether the educational level of migrants was much better than that of sending 
population (14.0 per cent vs. 10.4 per cent).  
 
Table 2. Permanent citizens of Poland (aged 15 and more) staying abroad for longer than 12 
months by the level of education (in per cent) and year of departure (in per cent) 
  Level of education 
Year of departure tertiary secondary other 
Total 14,0 35,0 51,0 
Including:    
   1988 and before 15,6 34,6 49,8 
   1989-1991 11,8 33,4 54,9 
   1992-1994 13,4 36,3 50,2 
   1995-1997 13,4 36,4 50,2 
   1998-2001 15,2 35,6 49,2 
Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005, based on the unpublished census data 
 
Table 2 shows that the share of highly educated migrants was the highest before the beginning of 
the transition (15.6 per cent), then became relatively low in the years 1989-1991 (11.8 per cent), 
only to rise again in the following years. The same conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the 
LFS data which demonstrates that since the late 1990s the share of migrants with tertiary 
education has increased significantly (cf. Figure 10 in the annex). 
The educational structure of Polish migrants is closely related characteristics of given migration 
process. The highly educated were under-represented among those migrating to Germany and 
Italy, and over-represented among those migrating to other countries, especially to the United 
Kingdom (cf. Figure 8)16. Educational structure is closely connected to the type of migration, e.g. 
seasonal migrants are relatively worse educated. On the other hand, the most recent migration to 
English-speaking countries is the domain of young and relatively well-educated persons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 A very similar picture may be drawn on the basis of the LFS data (cf. Figure 11 in annex). 
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Figure 8. Permanent citizens of Poland (aged 15 and more) staying abroad for longer than 
12 months by the level of education (in percentages) and the country of destination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005, based on the unpublished census data 
 
One of the most controversial issues in current public debate is the migration of medical 
professionals. This is above all a consequence of the permanent demand for this type of migrants 
in highly developed states. In the light of unfavourable demographic trends as well as fluctuations 
on the labour markets, the majority of Western European states are facing significant deficiencies 
in the number of medical staff. In addition, this field represents a typical example of intangible 
services, that is, the human flow cannot be easily substituted with mobility of goods and services. 
In effect, potential immigrants may expect highly beneficial financial and social conditions, 
integration support and, in at least several receiving countries, simplified immigration procedures. 
Work offers targeted at healthcare workers in Central and Eastern European states are 
incomparably better than the opportunities created by local labour markets17. As a consequence, 
high migration propensity among this group should be expected. 
In the case of Poland, some indication of the scale of potential migration of medical professionals 
is provided by the issuing of certificates confirming qualifications and professional experience 
required by employers in Western European states. The number of issued certificates – 5,114 (as 
of the end of June 2006) amounted to 4.3 per cent of the total number of medical doctors in Poland 
(118,475). When talking about dentists, as of the end of June 2006, the above mentioned 
certificate was issued to 1,565 persons. This constitutes 5.1 per cent of the total number of dentists 
in Poland. Some data on semi-skilled medical staff has also been collected (for 2005): 2,830 
certificates issued to nurses compared to the 240,128 nurses registered in Poland, which amounts 
to 1.2 per cent of this professional group in Poland. Only 195 documents certifying qualification 
were issued to midwives compared to the 33,385 registered nationally, which amounts to 0.6 per 
cent among the professionally active (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005, Polish Ministry of Health 
data). 
                                                 
17 For example, in Poland a ‘resident’ (i.e. a graduate of a medical university with a permanent job secured by the government) can earn 
a gross salary of PLN 1,637 while he/she can earn 20 times more abroad (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005).  
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Table 3. Certificates issued to medical professionals – specialties with the highest number 
of certificates issued and the highest share in total number of active specialists (May 2004 – 
June 2006) 
Specialty No. of economically 
active doctors 
No. of certificates 
issued 
Share of certificates in the total 
no. of specialists 
Specialties with the highest number of certificates issued 
Anaesthesiology 3 984 625 15.6
Surgery 5 395 334 6.1
Orthopedics 2 261 168 7.4
Internal diseases* 11 792 163 1.38
Radiology 1 993 154 7.7
Specialties with the highest relation of certificates issued to the number of active specialists 
Anaesthesiology 3 984 625 15.6
Plastic surgery 142 21 14.7
Chest surgery 218 28 12.8
Radiology 1 993 154 7.7
Orthopedics 2 261 168 7.4
Total 81 346 3 074 3.7
* data for end of June 2005 
Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005, based on the Ministry of Health data.  
 
It would be hard to consider the scale of migration estimated this way alarming and this is the line 
followed in the evaluations by researchers and specialists from the Ministry of Health. Although 
migration of the so-called ‘white personnel’ is a noticeable phenomenon, its scale is not so large as 
to pose a threat to the healthcare system in the short-term. This threat is not that significant 
because, in the experts’ opinion, the Polish educational system “produces” medical professionals 
at a rate still higher than their potential outflow to other states. In fact, to some extent migration of 
medical specialists may be viewed as a brain overflow rather than brain drain, which is particularly 
true in the case of young professionals trapped in the Polish “feudal” organisational structures of 
the medical profession with limited chances for promotion. Nonetheless, the outflow of medical 
doctors appears very painful in the case of certain specializations. This especially refers to 
anaesthesiology (here the percentage of potential migrants amounted to almost 16 per cent!), 
chest surgery (12.8 per cent), plastic surgery (14.7 per cent), as well as radiologists (7.7 per cent). 
The outflow problem has a considerable impact on specialties of the most difficult position in terms 
of income on the Polish labour market (anaesthesiologists, radiologists) or of high demand on 
foreign labour markets (plastic surgeons). Moreover, a temporary or permanent imbalance on local 
and regional labour markets is likely to happen (or has already happened). 
The above presented data may be supplemented by information on the migration of students – a 
group usually perceived as extremely mobile. The official data says very little about the real scale 
of the phenomenon. Less than 10,000 persons annually participate in exchange programmes 
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(ERASMUS, programmes based on bilateral agreements). According to estimates of the Ministry of 
Education, the number of persons studying abroad “out of their own accord” may be even 2 or 3 
times higher. Nevertheless, the scale of students’ mobility in Poland is very low and far below 
Western European standards (see next part). 
Very little is known about the educational attainment or skill level of migrants from other EU8 
countries. In the case of Hungary, starting back from 1989 the number of R&D employees fell  
dramatically -  from ca. 45,000 in 1989 to 20,000 in 1995. Among other causes, it had resulted 
from the transformation of science and research related institutions. In effect, some highly skilled 
individuals were either looking for employment in other areas nationwide or went abroad.  
However, this tendency was gradually reversing – in the early 1990s roughly 4-5 per cent of 
Hungarian R&D employees temporarily resided abroad (work or scholarships), while in 1999-2001 
this number went down to ca. 2 per cent. In the case of Hungary the outflow referred mostly to 
representatives of natural sciences and medical sciences. At the end of the 1990s this outflow 
started being compensated with the inflow of foreign R&D staff. Nevertheless, the problem was 
that, in the majority of cases, the inflow concerned specialists in the social sciences (e.g. in 1999 
150 natural sciences and 138 medical sciences’ professionals went abroad with an inflow of 139 
and 30, respectively).  The key point is that for Hungary the flow of workers in the scientific area 
was of low importance – the process of brain circulation concerned merely 10 per cent of all 
scientific institutions (Inzelt 2003). 
An interesting case is the Baltic States, where the mass outflow of high-class specialists was a 
direct consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In the case of Lithuania, in 1992 over 
5,000 university graduates left the country, but in the later years the figure dropped radically and 
was not more than 600 in 1996 and slightly over 400 in 2000. In this sense the trends in the 
migration of specialists were quite similar to the general pattern of migration in the region (Ribickis 
2003). 
Recent surveys showed a relatively high propensity for going abroad in most CEE countries. As far 
as the highly skilled are concerned, in 2004 almost 26 per cent of Lithuanian doctors and nurses 
planed to seek employment abroad. Similar research conducted among Estonian health care 
professionals gave the result of 5.4 per cent of respondents (which is about 700-800 individuals) 
who had definite plans to work abroad, 17.9 per cent who developed such plans and 32.3 per cent 
who had a vague plan. Only 44.4 per cent of respondents did not take emigration into account. 
Migration intentions of medical professionals are even stronger in other EU8 countries, even if 
recorded migration flows are moderate (Figure 12 in the annex). 
At the same time, surveys reveal the temporary character of intended migration of highly skilled. 
Out of all Estonian medical professionals who want to work abroad, 6.5 per cent want to leave the 
home-country for permanent, while 44.5 per cent for a couple of years and 22 per cent for a couple 
of months. The percentages of physicians and nurses who want to emigrate permanently (among 
the total of those who want to emigrate) are 25 per cent for Poland, 11 per cent for the Czech 
Republic, 7 per cent for Hungary and 5 per cent for Lithuania. According to a survey research of 
the Estonian working-age population, in 2003 out of the total 3 per cent would definitely wish to 
work abroad permanently, while a further 6 per cent for a few years only (Vörk, Kallaste, Priinits 
2004; Aidis, Krupickaitè, Blinstrubaitè 2005). 
In at least a few countries of the region (Poland, the Baltic States), the propensity to migrate is 
relatively high among the highly skilled. Nowadays migrant workers are well-educated and young. 
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The key factor that determines the possible consequences for sending societies and their 
economies is the duration of stay abroad. Past migration trends and survey research results 
indicate a temporary character of labour migration. Nevertheless, there already are specific labour 
shortages, for instance of qualified workers, medical professionals etc., and, thus, these countries 
will face the need for importing foreign labour force in the near future. 
 
 
 
5. Brain drain, brain exchange or brain waste? 
Independently from the above data indicating that we still have to do with positive selection of the 
emigrants from Poland with regard to education, this process does not have a mass character, and 
its scale and significance are decisively incomparable to the phenomena faced in the 1980s. 
Regardless of the fact that Polish migrants are, at least to some extent, positively selected with 
respect to human capital, they are concentrated predominantly in the secondary sectors of 
receiving economies and taking jobs in “typical” migrant sectors such as construction, agriculture, 
cleaning, hotels.  
This conclusion can be drawn, among others, from the WRS data. The largest group of workers 
from the A8 countries (34 per cent) includes persons hired in administration, business and 
management, with a further 21 per cent working in hospitality and catering, 12 per cent in 
agriculture and 8 per cent in manufacturing. In absolute terms, the majority of migrants applied for 
work in the administration, business and management sector (143,805). Polish workers dominated 
in all sectors. 
However, the above presented picture may be misleading18. Considering the information on the 
occupations of applicants from accession countries, it turns out that they mainly undertake simple 
jobs which do not demand high skills. From this perspective, data on occupations are hardly 
comparable with the data on sectors in which applicants were employed (cf. Table 4). Among the 
top occupations are such posts as  process operative (over 95,000 applicants till June 2006), 
warehouse operative (25,215), packer (24,130), kitchen and catering assistant (24,090), cleaner, 
domestic staff (20,430), farm worker (18,105), waiter/waitress (15,840) can be found. The biggest 
group of workers was classified as process operatives (other factory worker) (36 per cent) and was 
followed by catering assistants (10 per cent) and packers (9 per cent).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 For example. in case of administration, business and management the problem is that workers in this sector work predominantly for 
recruitment agencies so could be employed in a variety of occupations. 
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Table 4. 28 (of 250) top occupations among the A8 immigrants, July 2004 - June 2006 
* 84 per cent of all occupations 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the Home Office data 
 
The above presented data shows that a vast majority (80-90 per cent) of migrants from the A8 
countries are hired for occupations that need no professional qualifications. Other sources state 
that out of the total number of migrants from Poland to the UK the share of persons holding a 
university degree exceeds 25 per cent. This would indicate that, certainly, positive effects related to 
opportunities for qualification improvement or professional development are out of range for the 
majority of educated migrants. Rather wasting or deskilling of brains, a typical phenomenon for the 
migration of the 1980s, should be expected.  
As already stated, recent migration from Poland is marked by a higher share of persons with 
tertiary education than for the total population. This picture may be completely misleading without 
assessment of the structure of the Polish population. In the last 20 years, Poland experienced a 
true educational breakthrough. Between 1970 and 2001, the share of university graduates among 
the Polish population increased from 2 per cent to 12 per cent. At the end of the 1990s, the number 
of students was 2.6 higher than in 1990. Nowadays in Poland there are over 1.8 million students, 
and the data from GUS (the Central Statistical Office) shows that in the early 2000s the gross 
enrolment ratio (the rate of all studying to the whole population) in the age group 19-24 was close 
to 50 per cent, which means that as for the universality of higher education Poland has almost 
reached the standards of the developed countries (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005). If we take into 
consideration that a higher propensity to migrate is typically a feature of relatively young persons 
(aged 18 to 35), the recent increase in the highly skilled migration may be a statistical artefact only. 
In this context the increase in the share of relatively well-educated migrants should be perceived 
as a natural consequence of educational developments in Poland. Outflow of persons with tertiary 
education who often face serious problems on the Polish labour market can thus be described as 
brain overflow and not brain drain. This process does not necessarily have to be negative for 
Polish economy – those who leave stand a better chance to find work and accumulate money they 
may use in the sending country afterwards (if they return, obviously…). Additional benefits may 
result from gaining professional and cultural experience19. 
                                                 
19 Additional benefits may arise due to the positive impact on human capital formation i.e. through the demonstration effect as proposed 
by Oded Stark (2005). However, in case of Poland and other CEE countries whose citizens regardless of their skill level are employed 
predominantly in secondary sectors of receiving economies, this effect seems to be rather doubtful. 
No. Occupation Number of applicants No. Occupation Number of applicants
1 Process operative 95 865 16 Chef’s assistant 4 845
2 Warehouse operative 25 215 17 Truck driver 3 620
3 Packer 24 130 18 Administrator, general 3 600
4 Kitchen assistant 24 090 19 Fruit picker 3 580
5 Cleaner, domestic staff 20 430 20 Driver, delivery van 2 695
6 Farm worker 18 105 21 Hotel porter 2 435
7 Waitress 15 840 22 Carpenter 2 355
8 Maid 13 835 23 Bus driver 2 245
9 Care assistant 12 610 24 Launderer 1 720
10 Sales assistant 10 535 25 Leisure and theme park attendant 1 700
11 Construction worker 10 525 26 Baker 1 695
12 Crop harvester 8 020 27 Butcher 1 545
13 Food processing operative (fruits/veg.) 6 295 28 Mechanic 1 505
14 Bar staff 6 030 Together 28 occupations* 326 495
15 Food processing operative (meat) 5 030 All ocupations 388 265
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In the early 2000s the share of migrants with tertiary education among all expatriates in Poland 
(and also other CEE countries) was higher than in the case of the total population but, at the same 
time, significantly lower than for well-developed countries. In many cases (European countries), the 
share of expatriates with tertiary education was higher than 30 per cent, in a few cases (USA, 
Japan, Australia) close to 50 per cent. The relative scale of highly skilled migration seems 
moderate, and is higher only than in such countries as Turkey and Southern European countries20. 
In this context, the increasing scale of highly skilled migration from Poland is to be perceived as a 
rather typical and not exceptional process. In fact, from the data included in table 5 it follows that 
the structure of migration predominantly reflects the composition of the sending society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Expatriates from selected OECD countries by level of education around 2000 (in per 
cent)  
Share of expatriates with: Country 
tertiary education secondary education primary education 
Number of 
expatriates 
USA 49,9 28,3 21,8 809 540
Japan 49,7 38,9 11,4 575 992
Australia 45,9 33,1 21,0 267 314
UK 41,2 32,8 26,0 3 229 676
Canada 40,6 40,0 19,4 1 044 978
France 36,4 32,8 30,8 1 013 581
Germany 30,4 42,1 27,5 2 993 757
Hungary 29,6 42,4 28,0 314 922
Ireland 27,5 21,2 51,2 792 316
Poland 26,6 42,0 31,4 1 276 482
Czech Rep. 25,2 50,5 24,3 215 879
Spain 18,7 27,8 53,5 763 013
Italy 13,0 26,8 60,3 2 430 339
Turkey 6,4 21,7 71,9 2 195 645
Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005, based on OECD 2005. 
Similarly, figure 9 shows that the scale of students’ mobility from and into Poland is far from well-
developed countries’ standards. In contemporary societies students’ migration became a common 
and inevitable phenomenon – an integral part of an academic or professional career. Looking at 
trends in the development of the educational systems in Poland and other CEE countries it would 
also be reasonable to expect gradual increase in the mobility of students.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20 In the latter cases, a relative low share of expatriates with tertiary education is the consequence of massive recruitment of low-skilled 
workers in the past (questworker scheme).  
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Figure 9. Foreign students in selected OECD countries, 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005. 
 
However, one has to remember that this particular group is hardly predictable with respect to their 
migration strategies and plans. Temporary mobility (scholarships, training) may easily transform 
itself into permanent stay in the destination country. That is one of the reasons for the growing 
popularity of recruitment programmes targeted at students applied in the USA, Canada, Australia 
and most Western European countries. 
The mobility of the highly skilled does not necessarily lead to negative consequences as described 
in public debates. Recent developments do not entitle to draw dramatic pictures of brain drain. 
Interestingly, the authors of reports on the mobility of Polish scientists, while using an alarming title 
“brain exodus” for the first report in the series, concluded their research with the humble statement 
on the “mobility of scientists” in the third one spanning the period of 1994 -1996 (Hryniewicz, 
Jałowiecki, Mync 1997). On the other hand, as clearly stated by the authors, the outflow of 
scientists from Poland has not lead to a brain drain, but on the other, it also has not succeed in 
terms of brain exchange, i.e. exchange of thoughts, ideas and experiences relevant for the 
development of scientific research in Poland.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Outflow of highly skilled specialists is a highly complex matter that gives rise to many 
controversies. On the one hand the outflow of specialists (loss of human capital) can be treated as 
one of the reasons of the relative technological backwardness of the states from the region. On the 
other, in the era of globalization migrations are becoming an inevitable phenomenon. This 
particularly concerns specialists or, more generally, persons with tertiary education. The global 
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economy in its current shape generates a considerable demand for such migrants related to the 
recent labour division on a global basis, entailed by the dynamic growth of new technologies in the 
services (including intangible services) and increasingly better opportunities in communications. 
Migrations of highly skilled persons are becoming a natural element of economic and social 
processes, and human resources as well (e.g. scholarships, scientific internships, mobility within 
transnational companies). Therefore, the pejorative notion of “brain drain” has been abandoned in 
favour of such terms as “circulation” or “brain exchange”.  
The crucial issue is that a significant share of highly-skilled persons among emigrants is featured in 
highly developed states; the higher the level of socio-economic development, the more transparent 
this interdependence. Therefore, the increasing contribution of immigrants from CE countries 
holding university degrees should not be a surprise. On the contrary, it is to be expected that social 
and economic progress will result in the relative growth in the value of the migration of specialists 
from this region. However, brain drain may be a real issue for sending countries. This may occur if 
a negative balance in the migration of highly skilled personnel is observed, and would be 
particularly painful in the case of intangible services (i.e. medical services). Such a phenomenon 
may be particularly true in the case of Poland – a country with no tradition of immigration, where 
the inflow of highly skilled persons is relatively low. 
In accordance with earlier prognosis, since the accession into the EU an increase in the scale of 
migration has been observed (although the scale of the phenomenon may be surprising for most 
migration specialists). The most drastic changes concern migration to the UK and Ireland, i.e. two 
of the three countries which opened their labour markets in May 2004. So far, this migration should 
not be described in terms of exodus, especially as predominantly of short-term character. 
Changes in the scale of mobility observed since May 2004 concern highly skilled persons or 
specialists to a small degree. The most significant increase was revealed in the case of students 
and medical professionals. The first case should not be perceived in negative terms; to the 
contrary, the mobility of students in the contemporary world is an important aspect of education 
and may increase future productivity / stock of human capital. The case of medical professionals is 
the most controversial issue in recent public debates on migration. So far, this process is still far 
from being a mass one. However, even today the outflow of nurses and doctors results in serious 
problems on the local and regional markets (particularly in the case particular specialties). 
Additionally, in the face of the dramatic situation in the Polish health services sector, the scale of 
medical professionals’ mobility may increase dramatically. The only way to stop the outflow or 
decrease its level would be a deep reform of the public health care system, including such spheres 
as education and training, working conditions, and earnings.  
Up to the early 1990s, the EU countries were not attractive for highly skilled migrants, who almost 
exclusively targeted traditional immigration countries such as the USA, Canada or Australia. This 
situation changed as a consequence of introducing selective pro-migratory measures in migration 
policies and applying recruitment programmes. This, in turn, increases the risk of outflow from 
Poland and other CEE countries. The most recent migration to the UK and Ireland may serve as a 
perfect exemplification of this thesis. 
Mobility of top specialists could be, and in many cases is, a crucial factor spurring the development 
of scientific disciplines, fostering research, and exchange of thought and experiences. The survey 
carried out by Hryniewicz, Jałowiecki and Mync (1997) proves that Polish scientists who emigrate 
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maintain close ties with Poland and the scientific community back in Poland21. Even when residing 
abroad, they can exert a huge influence upon the scientific activities in Poland, and contribute to 
transfer of knowledge and technologies. The key obstacle is lack of mechanisms that would enable 
the scientists to return to CE. Thus, one of the most important task for migration policy makers 
would be to create favourable conditions for those highly skilled migrants who would like to return 
to their home countries. 
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Annex 
Figure 10. Polish migrants by the level of education, 1994-2004 (3rd quarters, in  per cent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* no data available for 1999 
Source: Author’s elabouration based on the LFS data 
 
Figure 11. Share of migrants staying temporarily abroad (for longer than 2 months) with 
tertiary education in four most important receiving countries, 1994-2004, 3rd quarters (in  
per cent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author’s elaboration based on the LFS data 
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Figure 12. Migration intentions of health care professionals in selected countries, 2004. 
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Source: Fihel, Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2006. 
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